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1  | INTRODUC TION
Populism is one of the “buzzwords” of the 21st century (Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). It became a “sexy” term in everyday politi-
cal discourse, increasingly used by the media during and after Brexit, 
and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 (Rooduijn, 2018). The 
Guardian, one of the major daily British newspapers, indicated that 
whereas in 1998 about 300 articles referring to populism were pub-
lished, less than 20 years later, in 2016, this number was more than 
2000 (Rooduijn, 2018). This media attention is not surprising consid-
ering that support for populism increased in the past years. Taking 
the European context as an example, voting for populist parties in 
national elections increased from about 7 per cent to more than 25 
per cent since 2000; the number of European countries with popu-
list parties in the government has also increased, from two countries 
20 years ago to 11 countries by 2019 (Grindheim, 2019). The interest 
of psychology scholars in understanding populism and factors asso-
ciated with it has also increased over the past decade (e.g., Bettache 
& Chiu, 2018; Mols & Jetten, 2016, 2020; Obradovic et al., 2020; 
Reicher & Haslam, 2017). This could be the consequence of observ-
ing current socio- political events around the world that highlight ev-
idently the appeal of populism on politics and beyond.
Despite the current surge of scholarly attention on populism, in-
terest in populism is far from new. The term was applied as early as in 
the 19th century, to refer to the People's Party in the United States, 
and in 1967, a conference was organized by the London School of 
Economics and Political Science with the single aim of defining pop-
ulism. According to the verbatim report, scholars aimed at answering 
one question: “can a single concept of populism be extrapolated from 
all the populisms and their aspects which we shall look at; or shall we 
conclude, on the contrary, that what people call by the same name in 
different parts of the world and different periods of history are entirely 
different things…” (Conference on populism: verbatim report, 1967, 
p. 3). Interestingly, more than half a century later, scholars still do not 
have a consensual definition, and refer to populism as a “contested” 
concept (Brubaker, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).
Largely used by lay people to describe certain left- and right- 
wing political parties and leaders, contemporary scholars agree 
that populism is a multifaceted concept, which is used to refer to 
many distinct phenomena and has different meanings. Populism 
is conceptually approached as an ideology, a movement, a syn-
drome, a discourse style or frame, as well as a political strategy (see 
Aslanidis, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). It has been con-
ceived primarily as an ideology, which highlights how anti- elite and 
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Abstract
Research on populism spans disciplines, theoretical frameworks, and methodologies. 
As interest in the study of populism rises, social psychology scholars strive to under-
stand (social) psychological factors associated with it. The aim of this Special Issue is 
to highlight the unique yet complementary role of social psychology in understanding 
- and possibly tackling - populism. The papers comprising this Special Issue offer an 
in- depth, comprehensive study of the topic, while including theoretical and meth-
odological approaches to move the research in this field forward. Taken together, the 
papers provide insights of interest to academics, researchers, as well as policy makers 
and educators.
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people- centric messages appeal to individuals holding populist atti-
tudes (Mudde, 2004), and is partly associated with other ideologies, 
such as anti- immigration or anti- globalization (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 
2013; Neuner & Wratil, 2020). From this perspective, there are three 
core concepts in populism: the pure people, the corrupt elite, and the 
general will (Mudde, 2004). Most scholars agree that populism refers 
to differentiation and opposition of two distinct groups, “the pure 
people” versus “the corrupt elite,” which some refer to as vertical dif-
ferentiation (Brubaker, 2017). Indeed, a “minimal” definition of popu-
lism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be 
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” 
(Mudde, 2004, p. 543).
Despite the fact that a growing body of literature approaches 
populism as an ideology, there is still considerable debate about 
the advantages and disadvantages of framing it this way (de la 
Torre & Mazzoleni, 2019) instead of, for instance, a discursive style 
(Aslanidis, 2016), of defining populism as mainly involving a verti-
cal differentiation between the pure people versus the corrupt 
elite that should not be conflated with nationalism (De Cleen & 
Stavrakakis, 2017), or regarding the multiple meanings of “the peo-
ple” and the consequent horizontal differentiation between “us” 
the people and “them” the outside groups, mirroring nationalism 
(Brubaker, 2017, 2020). Right- wing populism, for instance, relies on 
a “two- dimensional vision of social space,” combining vertical and 
horizontal differentiations, targeting both the corrupt elite as well as 
migrants and all those who are seen as not belonging to the ethni-
cally homogenous nation (Brubaker, 2017, p. 362).
Importantly, regardless of how populism is framed and defined, 
and the resulting complexities in operationalizing it, one can find 
key psychological and social psychological constructs intertwined 
with it. At first glance, we can see classic social psychological pro-
cesses of self- categorization, influence, and politicized social iden-
tities at the core of populism (see also Aslanidis, 2020). Obradovic 
and colleagues (2020) recently offered an interesting psychological 
approach to populism, highlighting the importance of psychology 
to help understand the demand side of populism. While most re-
search has focused on the supply side of populism, examining po-
litical parties' manifestos and discourses of political leaders, less is 
known about the demand side, specifically about populist attitudes 
and what explains them (Hawkins et al., 2020). That is, while schol-
ars agree on the main features of populist leaders' discourses and 
rhetoric, it is still not clear how voters internalize these discourses 
and what psychological factors account for that. Obradovic and col-
leagues (2020) elaborate on the importance of psychology in the ef-
fort to understand the demand side of populism, focusing on three 
main factors: the classic social psychological division between us and 
them (i.e., social categorization and intergroup dynamics); economic 
and cultural processes related to status concerns; and collective 
emotions that are mobilized in political communication.
This special issue builds on these current advances, proposing that 
a more comprehensive approach can be offered by— specifically— a 
social psychological lens to populism. Approaching populism from 
a social psychological perspective can shed light not only on the 
individual and situational factors explaining populism support, but 
mainly capture its dynamic interplay relying on the classic Lewinian 
“person- environment interaction” approach (Lewin, 1936). Social 
psychology offers then a unique theoretical and methodological 
frame to understand how individual factors explaining the demand 
side of populism (e.g., economic grievances, cultural anxiety) interact 
with and are affected by situational, supply conditions (e.g., strate-
gic party positioning, charismatic leadership). Indeed, a recent pro-
posal for an integrative framework to understand populist radical 
right parties highlighted precisely the need for research focusing 
on the “feedback loop between ‘supply’ and ‘demand’” sides (Mols 
& Jetten, 2020, p. 3). A recent example that illustrates this inter-
play is offered by Kende and Kreko's (2020) analysis of the rise of 
right- wing populism support in East- Central European countries. 
The authors eloquently highlight how nationalism and normative 
prejudice toward minorities on the demand side are activated by an 
anti- immigrant, threatening discourse on the supply side. With a so-
cial psychological approach, we can ultimately help identify ways of 
successfully challenging the increasing support for populism.
2  | CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PRESENT 
SPECIAL ISSUE
In line with the recent agenda proposed by Aslanidis (2020), 
highlighting the importance of self- categorization and collective, 
politicized identities, this special issue offers a broader approach 
to the topic, which can help us frame key facets on both the 
demand and supply side of populism, and importantly understand 
their dynamic interaction. This is attained by delving into (a) both 
antecedents of support for populism examining, for example, the 
role of individual differences (such as collective narcissism, national 
nostalgia, ingroup identification) and structural conditions (such as 
deprivation), (b) outcomes of embracing a populist ideology on both 
the group and individual level, such as hostile outgroup attitudes and 
restoring control respectively, and (c) the interaction of demand- 
supply examining, for example, how individuals' beliefs, emotions, 
identities, and social representations are activated and mobilized by 
populist parties' messages and narratives.
We note that the contributions of this special issue, as most of 
the social psychological literature, approach populism as predomi-
nantly associated with a right- wing, nationalist ideology (but see 
Urbanska et al.). The authors present empirical evidence from several 
countries where populism is shaping the political discourse: Hungary 
(Lantos & Forgas), Germany (Hirsch, Veit, & Fritsche; Mahendran, 
English, & Nieland; Ardag & Thomeczek), the Netherlands (Smeekes, 
Wildschut, & Sedikides), France (Urbanska, Pehrson, & Guimond), 
Sweden (Mahendran, English, & Nieland), the United Kingdom 
(Mahendran, English, & Nieland), Ireland (Mahendran, English, & 
Nieland), and Australia (Flannery, Watt, & Phillips). This is import-
ant as it showcases that, while populism manifests fiercely in several 
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countries, scholars take notice and indeed examine the phenome-
non. To this end, both contextual and generalizable processes can be 
uncovered and pave the path for a more in- depth comprehension of 
relevant phenomena.
Golec de Zavala and Keenan provide a theoretical framework for 
using national collective narcissism— defined as “an ingroup identifi-
cation tied to an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about 
the unparalleled greatness of an ingroup” (de Zavala et al., 2009, 
p. 1074)— to understand right- wing populism. Essentially, the authors 
delve into the dynamic relation of demand- supply sides of populism 
focusing on how individuals' endorsement of collective narcissism 
is intertwined with populist narratives that mobilize it, and explain-
ing this way why illiberal right- wing populism is so substantially 
appealing.
Lantos and Forgas place their empirical questions in the de-
mand side of populism, examining collective narcissism and its role 
in predicting populist attitudes. They start by providing a reflection 
regarding the rise of populism in Hungary and continue with two 
research studies that provide evidence regarding the role of national 
collective narcissism on negative attitudes toward the European 
Union and support for the populist party Fidesz.
Adopting a social identity framework, Urbanska, Pehrson, and 
Guimond explore the role of identification with the government 
on past voting behavior and current voting intentions for a popu-
list party, and likelihood to switch from a non- populist to a popu-
list party. Their results demonstrate that lower identification with 
the government predicts support for (right or left) populist parties, 
above and beyond populist attitudes, highlighting the key role of so-
cial identification processes for understanding the demand side of 
populism.
Smeekes, Wildschut, and Sedikides focus on national nostalgia, 
that is longing for the nation's— positively remembered— past, and 
how it relates to (voting) support for populist radical right parties, 
demonstrating the importance of emotional factors within the in-
terplay of demand and supply sides of populist radical right parties. 
With a representative sample of native Dutch adults, the authors 
find positive associations between national nostalgia and voting, and 
sympathy for populist radical right parties. These associations are 
mediated by greater endorsement of ethnic nationhood and anti- 
Muslim attitudes.
Flannery, Watt, and Phillips explore the newly introduced con-
struct of “right- wing protective popular nationalism,” which concep-
tualizes right- popular nationalism and draws on the desire to protect 
and preserve the national culture and way of life. The authors pres-
ent a study conducted in the Australian context, examining the det-
rimental consequences of right- wing protective popular nationalism 
on intergroup relations, showing that it predicts and moderates ag-
gressive tendencies toward minority groups.
Hirsch, Veit, and Fritsche provide a motivated social cognition 
approach to right- wing populism, building on research on causal 
attribution and control. In two experimental studies conducted in 
Germany, the authors find that blaming antagonistic outgroups (such 
as immigrants) as well as prejudice— both of which often portray in 
the messages of populist leaders— increase feelings of control. The 
findings offer a new motivated social cognition lens to understand 
the supply side of populism.
Ardag and Thomeczek build on the ideational approach to popu-
lism, examining the interplay of demand and supply sides of populism 
in Germany, through an online experiment with German voters. Using 
a person- centered approach to unpack populist attitudes (latent pro-
file analysis), the authors empirically demonstrate that the impact of 
populist attitudinal profiles (high people- centrism, anti- elitism, right- 
wing authoritarianism, and collective narcissism) is contingent on its 
activation by environmental cues (e.g., Pegida party slogans).
Mahendran, English, and Nieland rely on social representations 
theory and a dialogical self- approach to critically analyze the con-
cept of home, how it is mobilized by the supply side of populism, 
in populist leaders' narratives, and how this is intertwined with cit-
izens actual social representations of home. Qualitative analysis of 
European citizens interviews highlights three main social represen-
tations of home (as a threatened space, a birthplace, and a lifespan 
journey) and how these are reflected in populist projects.
The thematic overlap between social psychology, political psy-
chology, and political science provides not only fruitful research 
directions, but also an exciting analytical framework of sociopolit-
ical events (see also Aslanidis, 2020). Underlining the role of social 
psychology in this frame is critical, and can provide outputs relevant 
not only to academics but, critically, to policy makers and educators. 
Such outputs can potentially be used in the effort to increase po-
litical literacy from an early age, allowing a more critical evaluation 
of populist messages and, possibly, minimizing populist appeal. This, 
of course, remains to be tested and would certainly require active, 
fluent collaboration among relevant stakeholders (such as research-
ers, practitioners, and educators). We thus believe this special issue 
is highly topical and may provide an avenue of communication of 
current theoretical and empirical perspectives that will stimulate an 
informed discussion on understanding the appeal of populism, its 
consequences, and ways of tackling it. This way, we aim to spark a 
scientific dialogue that will enhance social psychological theory and 
practice, and will advance our understanding of current (and future) 
sociopolitical issues.
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